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Alexis Staubus

Prospects for Justice and
Accountability in Syria

Alexis Staubus, Emory & Henry College
Abstract

further examines how the creation and
implementation of a special tribunal
for President Assad’s case is the best
available option for indicting President
Assad on international law charges and
holding a trial for his case.
Syria has been devastated by
civil war and contentious politics for
nearly seven years. In 2011, a protest
opposing Syrian President, Bashar alAssad, turned into a full-scale civil war
in Syria (“Why is there a War,” 2018).
However, the primary concern in Syria
has not only been years of violent civil
war and protests, but rather the focus has
been on President Bashar al-Assad and
his tactics for fighting in Syria’s civil war
(Human Rights Watch, 2018). During
Syria’s civil war, Assad has violated
international laws and human rights by
using torture, chemical weapons and
nerve agents, starving and withholding
humanitarian aid to Syrians, forcing
disappearances
and
displacing
thousands of Syrians (Human Rights
Watch, 2018). These acts have resulted
in the deaths of thousands of civilians
and forced as many as 23 million prewar Syrians out of the country (Ali &
Escritt, 2018). Assad has clearly violated
international law for years and has yet
to face the international court for his
crimes. This paper explores whether
there is a possibility that Assad could
be indicted by the international

In recent years, the international
community has closely monitored the
actions of Syrian president, Bashar-al
Assad. Since the outbreak of the Syrian
Civil War in 2011, President Assad has
continued to incite widespread violence
throughout Syria by committing mass
atrocities that violate international
laws. There is evidence to provide
proof of President Assad’s connection
to his crimes and that his crimes
have killed and displaced millions
of Syrians. However, the legalities of
indicting a head of state and the special
interests between the members of
the United Nations Security Council
create obstacles that make prosecuting
President Assad near impossible in
a traditional international court.
This paper analyzes the prospects of
President Assad being indicted by the
international community and tried
in a court for violating international
laws. The cases of Slobodan Milošević
and Charles Taylor are used to closely
examine both the similarities and
differences as they apply to President
Assad. The close examinations and
comparisons of these cases serve as
the method in determining the best
model for achieving an indictment and
trial for President Assad. This paper
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community and tried in a court for
violating international laws. If so, how
should the international community
pursue a trial and convict Assad of
international crimes? This paper will
evaluate the prospects of indicting and
trying Assad by examining the cases
of the former president of Yugoslavia,
Slobodan Milošević and the former
president of Liberia, Charles Taylor.
This paper will draw on both of these
cases as models for designing a special
international tribunal to try Assad for
violating international laws.
In 2000, following the death
of Syrian President Hafiz al-Assad,
Assad was elected to a seven-year
term as Syria’s president before being
re-elected in 2007 (Bashar al-Assad,
2018). Though many Syrians opposed
the transfer of power from father to
son, Syrians along with much of the
international community were hoping
Assad’s age, education, and exposure
to western culture would usher in a
new era of government characterized
by democracy and economic growth.
Assad promised Syrians a wide
array of reforms such as reviving the
economy, combating corruption, and
implementing a more democratic
means of government (“Syrian
President,” 2018). For the first time in
decades, independent newspapers
were permitted to publish and hold
public political forums for those who
were pressing for government reforms
(“Syrian President,” 2018). Assad also
released hundreds of political prisoners,
but despite the optimism of Syrians
and the international community,
Assad has continued to pursue hardline
stances on policy and use authoritarian
methods of governing. By 2001, not

only were the limitations on the press
put back in place, but public political
forums were closed and individuals
leading opposition toward the Syrian
government were arrested (Bashar alAssad, 2018).

Assad’s Atrocities
Following Assad’s actions in March
of 2011, after a number of teenagers
were arrested and tortured for
painting revolutionary slogans at
a school, there was an outbreak of
peaceful pro-democracy protests in
the city of Derra. Government security
forces sought to control the political
uprisings by using live ammunition
during protests resulting in the death
of several protesters. This event
triggered thousands of protesters to
take to the streets throughout Syria
to protest Assad’s presidency and call
for his resignation as Syrian president
(“Syria: The Story,” 2016). Government
opposition forces began to take up arms
as an act of defense and later used their
weapons to oust government security
forces from localities. As the violence
throughout Syria escalated, Syria
descended into a full-scale civil war.
By June 2013, reports from the United
Nations (U.N.) estimated the death toll
to be at 90,000 people (“Syria: The Story,”
2016). Seven years since the emergence
of the Syria’s civil war, as many as
400,000 people have been killed and at
least five million have fled Syria; leading
to the displacement of six million people
internally (Human Rights Watch, 2018).
Since the outbreak of the civil war in
Syria, Assad’s regime has resorted to
fighting government opposition groups
by means that violate international
90

Alexis Staubus
laws and human rights (“Why is there a
War,” 2018). Assad has guided deliberate
and indiscriminate attacks against
civilians and infrastructure belonging
to civilians by using chemical weapons
and nerve agents in areas under the
control of opposition groups (Human
Rights Watch, 2018). Government
forces have led more than 100 chemical
attacks resulting in the deaths of
thousands of civilians (Shaheen, 2016).
In 2015 alone, Assad was responsible for
69 chemical attacks and has continued
to use chemical weapons with nerve
agents on four occasions in 2016 and
on at least four occasions in 2017
(Shaheen, 2016). In addition to these
chemical attacks, Assad’s government
forces have dropped chlorine on eight
separate occasions (Human Rights
Watch, 2018). Assad’s regime has also
employed starvation, the withholding
of humanitarian aid, and the forcible
displacement of Syrians as tactics
during the war. Reports from the U.N.
indicate that by 2017 government and
pro-government forces had trapped an
estimated 540,000 persons in besieged
areas with rapidly deteriorating humane
conditions causing communities in
besieged areas to surrender to Assad’s
government forces (Human Rights
Watch, 2018). The Syrian Network for
Human Rights has documentation
indicating over 4,000 arbitrary arrests
have been conducted by Assad’s forces
and as of 2017 more than 80,000 people
remain disappeared. Such torture
and ill-treatment in detention and
forced disappearances have continued
throughout Syria (Human Rights
Watch, 2018).
Assad has persistently violated
international laws and could be charged

with international crimes. Because of
Assad’s use of chemical weapons, he
could be charged with the illegal use of
chemical weapons in addition to being
charged with crimes that span the seven
years of the civil war (Kelly & Whiting,
2018). These criminal acts punishable
under international law include:
attacking and detaining civilians and
prisoners of war, subjecting civilians and
prisoners to torture, and Syrians being
forcibly displaced by the Assad regime
(Kelly & Whiting, 2018). Each of these
crimes are considered to be criminal
acts worthy of punishment according to
customary international laws, which are
the Geneva Conventions. However, the
International Criminal Court (ICC or
the Court) has codified these customary
laws and the ICC recognizes a separate
statute, the Rome Statute. Each of the
international crimes mentioned are
categorized as international crimes
under the Rome Statute (Kelly &
Whiting, 2018). The Rome Statute was
adopted on July 17, 1998 at a diplomatic
conference in Rome, Italy. The Rome
Statute was later ratified in 2002 and is
supported by more than 120 different
countries. This international treaty
established the ICC and the Trust Fund
for Victims (TFV), which is used to
implement reparations by the ICC and
provide both physical rehabilitation
and psychological rehabilitation in
addition to providing material support
to victims (“Rome Statute”). The statute
provides legal definitions for crimes like
genocide, war crimes, crimes against
humanity, and crimes of aggression.
Essentially, the Rome Statute acts an
instrument that guides the legalities
of the ICC by elaborating on core legal
texts that form much of the framework
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of the ICC (“Rome Statute”). According
to the Rome Statute, Assad’s actions
over the course of the last seven years
of the Syrian Civil War directly violate
article seven in regards to crimes against
humanity and torture and article eight
in reference to war crimes and the use of
prohibited weapons. Therefore, Assad,
if indicted, could be charged with war
crimes, crimes against humanity, the
illegal use of chemical weapons, and
torture in accordance with the Rome
Statute (The International Criminal
Court, 1998).
Assad
has
committed
international crimes that violate the
Rome Statute; however, the ICC only
has the jurisdiction to indict and try
offenders from states that signed the
Rome Statute, and Syria is not a signatory
of the Rome Statute. This is problematic
when trying to indict Assad and put him
on trial for war crimes, crimes against
humanity, the illegal use of chemical
weapons, and torture, there is another
option (“Seeking Justice,” 2017). Another
option to indict Assad is to get a referral
to the ICC from the U.N. Security
Council. The UN Security Council is
comprised of a total of 15 members. Five
of these members: The United States,
the United Kingdom, France, China, and
the Russian Federation are permanent
members. In addition to these five
permanent members, there are another
ten non-permanent members that are
elected to the U.N. Security Council by
the General Assembly to serve two-year
terms (“Members”). This referral would
grant the necessary jurisdiction for the
ICC to indict and try Assad. However,
this is not likely to be a viable option
because there has to be a unanimous
vote from the U.N. Security Council to

refer Syria to the ICC (“Seeking Justice,”
2017). In 2014, the U.N. Security Council
voted on a resolution to allow the ICC
to go after officials in Syria for charges
of crimes against humanity. Though
the ten non-permanent members of
the UN Security Council voted in favor
of the resolution alongside three of the
permanent members, Russia and China
vetoed the resolution (Sengupta, 2014).
Obstacles to Trying Assad for
International Crimes
Both China and Russia have
special interests in Syria. China has
been offering the Assad regime financial
support as well as expressing interest in
playing a key role in the reconstruction
of Syria after the civil war. China sees
post-war opportunities to expand the
Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in key
regions of the Middle East. Assad will
need to make considerable investments
in
infrastructure
reconstruction,
services which BRI could provide
and China sees this as a business
opportunity (Kowalewski, 2018). Russia
has military bases located in Syria and
in 2015, Russian forces launched an air
campaign as a symbol of support to the
Assad regime (“Why is there a War,”
2018). Russia has special interests in
Syria because Moscow exports arms to
Syria and generates a profit and Russia’s
motive to support Assad’s regime is also
out of fear that Syria could collapse
with Russia’s support (Hill, 2013). China
and Russia have interests in Syria
compelling both states to vote against
any resolutions allowing the ICC to have
jurisdiction in Syria. Therefore, other
alternatives involving the international
community will need to be utilized if
Assad is going to be held accountable
for the international crimes he has
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committed during the Syrian Civil War.
The possible options available to seek
the indictment of Assad rely greatly on
the cooperation of the international
community, there are questions as to
if this will even be possible and how a
special tribunal would be structured
without the involvement of the ICC.
Assad, being the head of state in Syria,
also poses other unique concerns seeing
how indicting and trying a head of state
is a difficult process. Historically, the
difficulty of this process comes from a
customary principle in international law
based on state immunity (Mandhane,
2011). Traditionally, a custom of
international law is for the sitting head
of state to have “personal” immunity
while presiding in office where they
will be immune from foreign criminal
jurisdiction. State immunity recognizes
the functions of the head of state making
this custom of international law more
expansive than diplomatic immunity or
any other type of functional immunities.
State immunity recognizes the highlevels of diplomacy, negotiations, and
dispute settlements (Kiyani, 2013). A
Sitting head of state’s immunity is not
exclusive to when the head of state
is traveling for official government
business, but state immunity may also
apply when the head of state is traveling
for pleasure. However, the “personal”
component of state immunity afforded
to a head of state belongs to that of the
government, not the individual head of
state. Therefore, state immunity is not
permanent and may be waived by the
government at any time. Subsequently,
once the head of state no longer presides
of the state’s office, state immunity will
no longer be afforded to the head of
state (Kiyani, 2013). As Syria’s head of

state, Assad is afforded immunity under
customary international law, which
further complicates the process of
indicting Assad while he is still in power.
Since the end of the Cold War, there have
been less than seventy heads of state
that have withstood trial for violating
international laws. While holding
leaders such as Slobodan Milošević
and Charles Taylor accountable in a
court may have seemed like a daunting
and unachievable task, such tasks
have been accomplished. Though the
number of heads of state who have been
indicted and put on trial is small, such
indictments and trials of high authority
government figures have been made
possible due to a more recent emergence
of special courts and tribunals
(Mandhane, 2011). The last option of
constructing a special court or tribunal
is the most viable option for indicting
and putting Assad on trial. Analyzing
the cases of Milošević and Taylor are
best for comparison and determining
if holding Assad accountable for his
crimes will ever be possible.

The Case of Slobodan Milošević
As previously mentioned, indicting
and trying a head of state for violating
international laws is a difficult process.
However, the international community
did have success in the case of Slobodan
Milošević, former president of Serbia
from 1980 to 1997 and former president
of Yugoslavia from 1997 to 2000.
Milošević was indicted and put on
trial in an effort by the international
community to convict Milošević for
violating international laws during his
presidencies (Allcock, 2018). In 1987,
Milošević was elected as the President
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of the Communist Party of Serbia
and implemented a political style of
government centered on populism.
Milošević’s populist style of government
was appealing to Serbians, which
allowed Milošević to gain popularity
from Serbians who then began to call for
an “antibureaucratic revolution” over the
heads of the League of Communists of
Yugoslavia (Allcock, 2018). This allowed
Milošević to restore Serbia’s control
over Vojvodina and Kosovo and replace
party leaderships in the provinces
with his own party leadership while
ousting the leadership of the League of
Communists of Yugoslavia. Slovenia,
Croatia, and Macedonia seceded in
1991. The Bosniaks and Croats of Bosnia
and Herzegovina followed by a vote to
secede in 1992 (Allcock, 2018).
Milošević’s responses to these
successions resulted in the Yugoslav
Wars of Succession from 1991 to 1999
(Schulman, 2003). The Yugoslav Wars of
Succession consist of four wars: the war
in Slovenia in 1991; the war in Croatia
from 1991 to 1995; the war in Bosnia
and Herzegovina from 1992 to 1995;
and the war in Kosovo from 1998 to
1999 (“Slobodan Milosevic,” 2016). The
Yugoslav Wars of Succession resulted in
the redrawing of ethnic maps in Bosnian
and Croatia where Milošević’s primary
purpose was to ethnically cleanse
Bosnia and Croatia. This was done
with excessive force causing 250,000
deaths and nearly 3.5 million persons
to flee the country and become refugees
(Schulman, 2003). To attack Croatia and
Bosnia, Milošević utilized volunteer
militias, and he also used the Yugoslavia
army and joined forces with Franjo
Tudjman of Croatia to help exercise
forced movements of populations of

people living across Croatia and Bosnia
(Schulman, 2003). In addition to these
forces, Serbia Montenegro’s Territorial
Defense units, Serbian Ministry of
Internal Affairs police units, and
paramilitary units targeted, attacked,
and seized control over and drove out
populations of people residing towns,
villages, and settlements within the
territories of Bosnia and Croatia. Under
the advisement of Milošević, these
forces deported an estimated 170,000
Croats and other non-Serb civilians;
exterminated Croats and other civilians
who were of Serbian ethnicity; and
imprisoned thousands of Croats and
non-Serbs holding them in inhumane
conditions (“Slobodan Milosevic,”
2016). Following massive airstrikes that
had been deployed in Bosnia against
Serbian forces, the 1995 Dayton peace
agreement was forced through to end
the war (Schulman, 2003).
In 1997, Milošević was elected
by Yugoslavia’s federal parliament
to serve as President of the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia. This allowed
Milošević to maintain power since he
had already served two terms as the
president of Serbia and could not hold
presidential office for a third term
(Allcock, 2018). Later in 1998, there
was a deteriorating relationship after
years of dispute between Serbia and the
ethnic Kosovo Albanians that led to the
federal security forces and the guerrilla
Kosovo Liberation Army to engage in
open armed conflict. The consequences
of the conflict were the killings of
Serbian policemen and Serbian
politicians and the Serbians launching
an offensive to take out insurgents.
Milošević then ordered an ethnic
cleansing of the Kosovar Albanians.
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This drove out hundreds of thousands
of Kosovar Albanians out of the country
and into neighboring countries as
refugees (Allcock, 2018). In June of
1999, the Serbian military and forces
from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
began to use tactics such as terror and
systematic and widespread violence in
Kosovo to target the Albanian Civilian
population. The widespread violence
and chaos compelled NATO to launch a
military campaign between March and
June of 1999. This military campaign
supported by NATO coerced Serbian
forces to withdraw military troops
and military actions from Kosovo
(“Slobodan Milosevic,” 2016).
While president of the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia, Milošević
violated international laws by allegedly
leading a conspiracy in Kosovo to expel
the Kosovo Albanian population. In
addition to expelling nearly 800,000
Kosovo Albanian civilians from Kosovo,
other international crimes committed
by Milošević during this event include:
the systematic killing of Kosovo
Albanian men, women, and children
under the command of President
Milošević; sexual abuse of women;
and the systematic destruction and
looting of Kosovo Albanian property
(“Indictments”). As a result of Milošević
ordering such actions to take place in
Kosovo, in May 24, 1999, Milošević was
indicted by the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
on counts of deportation, crimes
against humanity, and violations of the
customs of war (Scharf, 1999). After
Milošević’s indictment in 1999, unrest
under his leadership and faltering
economy contributed to Milošević’s
being defeated by Vojislav Kostunica in

the presidential elections in September
2000. Later in 2001, the Yugoslav
government arrested Milošević and he
was turned over to the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia (ICTY) (Allcock, 2018).
After Milošević’s arrest and
transfer of custody to the ICTY, he was
indicted on October 8, 2001 for violating
international laws while actively
engaging in combat in Croatia. Soon
after this indictment, the ICTY’s Office
of the Prosecutor served Milošević
with another indictment for violating
international laws while fighting in
combat in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In
both of these additional indictments,
prosecutors alleged that Milošević, who
at the time was the sitting president
of the Republic of Serbia, was leading
a conspiracy to ethnically cleanse the
population. Prosecutors asserted this
conspiracy was similar to the Kosovo
conspiracy (“Indictments”). In Croatia,
Bosnia, and Herzegovina, forces under
the command of Milošević attacked
villages, towns, and municipalities and
then proceeded to take control of such
areas. Milošević’s military forces gained
control over territories by using a system
to prosecute non-Serbs in order to push
these non-Serbs out of the surrounding
territories. Force was used during this
process to expel men, women, and
children from their homes, they were
then gathered together to be held in
camps where the living conditions were
inhumane. In such camps, thousands
of non-Serbs were beaten, sexually
assaulted, tortured, and murdered.
Altogether, Milošević was indicted on
66 counts of violating international laws
(“Indictments”). In July 2001, Milošević
plead not guilty to all counts included in
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the indictment for Kosovo; on October
29, 2001 Milošević pled not guilty to all
the counts included in the indictment
for Croatia; and on December 11, 2001
Milošević pled not guilty to all the
counts included on the indictment for
Bosnia (“Slobodan Milosevic,” 2016).
Initially Milošević was charged on
three separate indictments, during
Milošević’s trial in February 2002 the
Appeals Chamber of the ICTY moved
to try the three separate indictments
pertaining to Kosovo, Croatia and
Bosnia and Herzegovina in one trial
(“Slobodan Milosevic,” 2016).
Milošević was indicted on
multiple charges of crimes against
humanity as well as violations of the
customs of war, a notably missing
charge on the indictment for Milošević’s
actions in Kosovo is genocide. Milošević
was responsible for ethnic cleansing
and charges of genocide, being the
most serious charges within a tribunal’s
jurisdiction, would strengthen the
prosecutor’s case. However, genocide
requires evidence to show a precise
intent to cleanse a territory or a
particular ethnic group (Scharf, 1999).
This makes genocide the most difficult
crime to prove. In this instance, in order
to prove the crime of genocide, evidence
in the courtroom must show the intent
to partly or entirely destroy an ethnic
group by: murdering members of a
targeted group; by causing serious
physical harm or mental harm to persons
of the targeted group; there must be
deliberate intent to inflict conditions
upon members of the targeted group
that will cause physical destruction to
part of the group or to the group as a
whole; proving there were actions taken
that would prevent procreation within

the group; and by proving the exercise of
force to transfer children of the targeted
group to a different group (Scharf,
1999). Therefore, getting a conviction
for the crime of genocide was less likely
because the tribunal’s precedent of the
murdering of 340 Kosovo Albanians
would not likely be considered genocide
when the population was that of 1.8
million (Scharf, 1999).
While still President of
Yugoslavia, Milošević was indicted by
the ICTY and then tried in this same
international criminal tribunal. The
ICTY, was established in May 1993 by
the U.N. is located in The Hague in the
Netherlands (“About the ICTY”). The
creation of this special tribunal was
initially sparked by the mass atrocities
that were taking place in Croatia and
Bosnia and Herzegovina at the time.
The ICTY was created to specifically
answer to war crimes that were
committed during the various conflicts
in the Balkans in the 1990’s as well as
to prosecute persons who were most
responsible for violating international
laws (“About the ICTY”). The ICTY was
the first war crimes court created by
the U.N. and has an estimated regular
budget of approximately $180,000,000
(“The Cost of Justice”). The court was
funded by contributions made from
member states of the U.N. The court
has continually received funding from
U.N. member states and has received
other funding from non-governmental
organizations as well as other
institutions (“Support and Donations”).

Milošević’s Trial
Milošević’s trial began on February 12,
2002 (Sadat, 2002). During the trial,
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Milošević declined the appointment
of a defense counsel and therefore
represented himself throughout the
extent of his trial (Scharf, 2006, 27).
However, Milošević did have a team
of legal experts who were helping him
develop his case outside of the tribunal
behind closed doors (Scharf, 2006,
28). Ultimately, the representation of
himself in court affected the amount of
testimony that could be presented by the
prosecution at trial as well as the overall
length of the trial. Milošević suffered
from a number of medical conditions
that reduced the number of days court
proceedings were held. Instead of the
tribunal holding trial proceedings five
days, the number of trial days a week
was reduced to three days a week in
addition to cutting the length of trial
days from eight hours a day to four
hours a day (Scharf, 2006, 27). Other
delays such as the court adjourning for
a period of a few weeks at a time for
Milošević’s health conditions resulted
in lost trial days. While Milošević’s
poor health conditions drew out the
length of the trial, the death of one
of the presiding judges, Richard May,
delayed the trial even further as a new
judge had to be appointed to the bench
in Judge May’s place (Scharf, 2006, 27).
Other delays in the court include the
uncooperativeness of Milosevic, whose
defiant actions at times would have
earned him expulsion in any other
courtroom (Scharf, 2006, 28).
The tribunal agreed to
hear charges relating to the Kosovo
indictment first and then hear the
charges relating to Croatia and Bosnia
and Herzegovina during a second phase
of the trial (Sadat, 2002). Throughout
the duration of Milošević’s trial, the

prosecution claimed Milošević used
army chiefs, military staff, interior
ministers, security services, and
presidents and prime ministers all
of which were regarded as top-level
officials from the governments of
Yugoslavia, Bosnia, and Croatia.
Prosecutors claimed Milošević used
these various government officials and
military officials as his co-perpetrators
(“Prosecution Case”). The prosecution
also argued Milošević provided the
finances, personnel, logistical planning,
and operational support to his coperpetrators so he would be able to
seize territory in Croatia, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, and Kosovo with better
ease. Furthermore, prosecutors argued
that the paramilitaries and police forces
who committed the criminal acts had
received orders to commit such crimes
by Milošević and his co-perpetrators
in addition to receiving appropriate
funding and political support from
Milošević (“Prosecution Case”). The
prosecution made clear throughout
their arguments how Milošević created
an atmosphere that encouraged
the victimization of civilians; an
atmosphere that directly violates
international laws, since according to
international laws, political leaders,
police forces, and military forces are
legally obligated to protect the lives of
civilians (“Prosecution Case”).
In an effort to prove the
credibility of their argument, the
prosecution’s evidence in the trial
included testimony, audio files, video
content, and documentaries which
were presented over the course of 90
days during the trial. 293 witnesses
were called upon by prosecutors during
Milošević’s trial to testify (“Prosecution
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Case”). Witnesses testifying during the
trial included police experts, military
experts, legal experts whose testimony
centered on how there was legal
subordination between the military
and Milošević; and victims who used
their testimonies to describe how they
had suffered from the crimes Milošević
had perpetrated. Witnesses also made
remarks on the evidence presented
demonstrating that Milošević had
undermined legal chains of command.
Forensic experts testified and presented
evidence to the tribunal showing bodies
that had been exhumed from graves in
Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and
Kosovo and that those deaths had been
caused by the commands of Milošević
(“Prosecution Case”). Demographic
experts showed the tribunal through
their testimonies how there were
drastic decreases in populations of
people who were not Serbs living in
territory controlled by Milošević.
The court also heard testimony from
international representatives and highlevel officials. Testimony from these
individuals provided information in
regards to meetings that had been
held with Milošević where the coperpetrators gave reports on the acts of
violence and crimes they were carrying
out by following the orders of Milošević.
Other witnesses who testified had
worked under Milošević and were able
to provide an insight into how Milošević
operated (“Prosecution Case”).
The
prosecution
also
submitted audio evidence, video
evidence, and documentary evidence
to the court. This evidence content
amounted to 672 exhibits and over
29,000 pages of documents. This
evidence provided the court with

minutes from meetings between
Milošević and his co-perpetrators
and voice audio recordings of their
conversations (“Prosecution Case”).
The video submitted into evidence
showed Milošević overseeing military
units, the same military units that were
responsible for executing violate crimes
that were in violation of international
laws. Lastly, a preponderance of
evidence was submitted to the court
by prosecutors to stress that Milošević
is the person who is most responsible
for the suffering of thousands of victims
(“Prosecution Case”).
As for the defense, Milošević
represented himself during the trial.
Despite his declining health, he proved
to the court that his mental health and
physical health were stable enough to
act as his own defense. He proved the
stability of his health to the tribunal
as he routinely took command over
cross-examining witnesses and the
allegations asserted by the prosecution
surrounding the atrocities he allegedly
committed (Sadat, 2002). As for his
defense strategies, rather than seeking
a dismissal or an acquittal, Milošević
repeatedly denied the legitimacy and
legalities of the ICTY and wanted to
publicly discredit the tribunal (Scharf,
2006, 32). This was his one consistent
strategy in his defense throughout
the trial. However, Milošević also
consistently challenged and made
efforts to damage the credibility of
the witnesses brought forth by the
prosecution and undermine witness
testimonies (Sadat, 2002). Milošević’s
defense largely concentrated on
the Kosovo indictment (Slobodan
Milosevic, 2016). Milošević focused on
portraying himself as being a typical
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civil servant to his country, and a
president who had been kept in the
dark about the major decision-making
processes in reference to the events
that occurred in Croatia, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, and Kosovo throughout
the 1990s (Bass, 2003). Milošević called
on several witnesses to testify in his
defense. Much of the defense’s witnesses
included those who were part of Serbian
security forces and had remained loyal
to him. Other witnesses included
Richard Holbrook, a former United
States assistant secretary of state.
Holbrook testified to the tribunal how
during conflicts with Bosnia is 1995 that
Milošević was the one responsible for
reigning in Bosnian Serbs and being a
key component to helping pave the way
for the Dayton Accord. In addition to the
defense calling on witnesses to testify,
other forms of evidence submitted to
the court were letters in support of
Milošević (Bass, 2003).
Milošević’s trial began in
2002 and the trial was still ongoing
by March 2006 (Slobodan Milosevic,
2016). Since 2001, Milosevic was being
held in the U.N. detention center at
The Hague. During the early morning
hours on March 11, 2006 Milosevic
was found dead in his holding cell
(Simons & Smale, 2006). According
to the autopsy report, Milošević’s had
suffered from a heart attack resulting in
his death (“Preliminary Autopsy,” 2006).
Milošević’s trial was dismissed on March
14, 2006. Despite, the premature ending
of Milošević’s trial before a verdict could
be reached, Milošević’s trial is still a
critical case to examine when evaluating
the possibilities of trying and indicting
Assad for violating international laws.
Not only was Milošević the first sitting

head of state to be indicted and brought
forth to answer before a special tribunal
for allegedly violating international
laws, but Milošević’s trial marked the
end of an era where a sitting head of
state was immune to being held legally
responsible for violating international
laws. Milošević’s trial set a precedent
and since his trial heads of state like
Saddam Hussein and Charles Taylor
have been indicted and tried in special
tribunals for violating international
laws (“Weighing the Evidence,” 2006).

Milošević’s Case Serves as a Model
for Assad
Milošević’s case is applicable to Assad
because the indictment and trial of
Milošević is something many never
thought could happen. Not only does
Milošević’s case demonstrate that this
is possible, but the ICTY shows the
possibility of designing a special tribunal
with the capacity to try complex cases.
Since the trial, the structure of the ICTY
has been used as an example for how
to structure other special tribunals.
Therefore, using the ICTY as a model
would be useful in creating a tribunal
that would have success in trying Assad.
Assad is similar to Milošević in that
both, while heads of states, allegedly
have engaged in criminal activities that
have violated international laws such
as crimes against humanity and war
crimes (Groll, 2013). Both Assad and
Milošević’s means of carrying out such
crimes have included torture, forcibly
displacing thousands of native persons,
and attacking civilians. A specific
example of the parallels between the
two cases can be seen between the
events that took place Kosovo and those
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happening in Syria under Assad. Serbs
were being accused of systematically
using force to displace a population of
people and carrying out massacres to
target and attack Albanians in Kosovo
during the 1990’s. Meanwhile, Assad has
been utilizing security forces in Syria
to exploit chemical weapons to attack
territories being ruled by Sunni rebels
(Groll, 2013). Assad and Milošević’s
cases overlap in terms of the crimes
they both have committed and how they
systematically carried out crimes that
violated international laws. They are
also similar in the aspect that Milošević

was once a ruling head of state and the
international community was doubtful
of ever having the opportunity to hold
Milošević accountable and Assad
is currently a head of state who the
international community has doubts if
his power will ever diminish and allow
for justice to be served.
Table 1
A Similar Comparison of Slobodan
Milošević and Bashar al-Assad

The Case of Charles Taylor
Milošević’s case is not the only case to
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serve as a blueprint for indicting and
trying Assad for violating international
laws. Charles Taylor was the president
of Liberia from 1997 to 2003 and was
the first head of state to successfully be
tried and convicted in a special tribunal.
While in office, his presidency was largely
marked by rebellion and conflict as he
encouraged and executed a number
of crimes during the civil war in Sierra
Leone throughout the 1990s. During the
civil war in Sierra Leone, government
forces were trying to oppose attempts
of ‘coup d’état’ being made by two rebel
groups: The Revolutionary United Front
and the Armed Forces Revolutionary
Council (“Charles Taylor,” 2018). Both
rebel groups received support from the
National Patriotic Front of Liberia as
Taylor provided support to the rebel
groups in forms of money, materials,
personnel, weapons, ammunition, and
military training. As president of Liberia,
Taylor encouraged military actions
of the Revolutionary United Front
and the Armed Forces Revolutionary
Council alliance. These military actions
supported and funded by Taylor
include the launch of armed attacks
targeting civilians, humanitarian aid
workers, and the peacekeeping forces
sent by the U.N. During these attacks,
murders, mutilations, rape, and the
pillaging and abducting of civilians
to be used as sex slaves were crimes
in which Taylor became notorious for
encouraging and executing (“Charles
Taylor,” 2018). Taylor was also known for
using war tactics involving the drugging
of children and then utilizing them
to mine for diamonds in order to pay
for guns and gun ammunition. Taylor
is responsible for the deaths of nearly
50,000 people and the forced relocation

of thousands of refugees and leaving
Sierra Leone in debris as the country
struggles to repair infrastructure and
regain natural resources (Simons, 2012).
Holding Taylor legally responsible in
court for these serious crimes that he
had a hand in executing during the
civil war was made possible through
the establishment of a special tribunal,
The Special Court for Sierra Leone
(SCSL). The physical establishment of
the SCSL is located in Freetown, Sierra
Leone and the Appeals Chamber of
the court is placed in close proximity
to The Hague in Leidschendam,
Netherlands (“Charles Taylor,” 2018).
Locating the special tribunal in a
neighboring country required the
approval of the U.N. Security Council.
The Security Council passed Resolution
1315 formally requesting the U.N.
Secretary-General to begin negotiations
with the Sierra Leone government to
create a special tribunal. In 2002, after
Resolution 1315 was passed, the U.N.
Secretary-General and the Sierra Leone
government signed the Agreement on
the Establishment of a Special Court for
Sierra Leone formally establishing the
creation of the SCSL (Perriello & Wierda,
2006). The decision to locate the court
in Sierra Leone was based on problems
that the ICTY and other international
criminal tribunals had faced with the
tribunals being located in territories
outside of where the atrocities were
committed. Both tribunals had to
find financial supporters to back the
extraordinary expenses of the court,
there were periods of slow progress,
and lack of knowledge in regards to
proceeding with victims under the
court’s jurisdiction. In addition to trying
to minimize such difficulties faced by
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international tribunals, Sierra Leone
was willing to host the SCSL because
the location would emphasize respect
for the sovereignty of Sierra Leone and
encourage legitimacy in the rule of law
and in the country’s domestic legal
system (Perriello & Wierda, 2006).

was held by the SCSL while utilizing
ICC courtrooms and then later due to
scheduling conflicts the SCSL utilized
the courtroom at the Special Tribunal
for Lebanon (Special Court for Sierra
Leone). After the transfer of the court to
The Hague, six of Taylor’s charges were
dropped to reduce the duration of the
trial. Taylor’s trial began in June 2007
at the SCSL in Freetown, Sierra Leone
(“Charles Taylor,” 2018). Before the
commencement of his trial, Taylor had
agreed to be represented by a defense
team and was generally cooperative.
The court sat three years and ten
months, which was approximately 420
days of court (“Even a ‘Big Man’,” 2012).
As for evidence used in Taylor’s trial,
1,522 exhibits were moved into evidence,
115 witnesses gave testimony, and 281
written decisions were issued. The
prosecution called upon 94 witnesses to
give testimony. Three witnesses testified
as experts, 59 of the witnesses were
persons who testified to the crimes
that had been committed, and 32 of the
witnesses were persons who testified to
the links between the crimes that had
been committed by Taylor himself. The
prosecutors greatly relied on “insider”
witnesses as an attempt to link Taylor
to the serious crimes committed. These
witnesses were those who were often
suspected of committing serious crimes
or had admitted to committing serious
crimes (“Even a ‘Big Man’,” 2012). The
prosecution used their evidence to
claim Taylor was the provider of military
training and support to the rebel
groups in Sierra Leone. Prosecutors
also used their evidence to argue
Taylor had knowledge of the crimes
being committed by the rebel groups
he supported, or he at least should

Taylor’s Trial
Taylor was indicted by the SCSL on
March 7, 2003 on 17 counts of violating
international laws. The 17 charges in
the indictment included: war crimes
for acts of terrorism, collectively
punishing a civilian population,
violence to life and persons, outrages
of personal dignity, and the pillage and
abductions of persons, all of which
are prohibited by international laws.
Taylor was also charged with crimes
against humanity, which included the
extermination of civilians, murder,
rape, and the enslavement of persons
(“Charles Taylor,” 2018). At the time of
the indictment, Taylor was traveling
outside of Liberia, so an international
arrest warrant was issued for Taylor
to immobilize and pressure him to
return to Liberia (Wladimiroff, 2005).
After pressure from the international
community, on August 11, 2003 Taylor
resigned from his office as president
of Liberia. Later in 2006, Taylor was
arrested near Cameroon and handed
over to SCSL when he pled not guilty to
the international crimes that had been
charged with (“Charles Taylor,” 2018).
However, on June 16, 2006, the SCSL
was transferred to The Hague on the
basis that the court proceedings being
housed in Sierra Leone was inciting
violence and threatening the peace
and stability of West Africa. The trial
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have had knowledge of such events,
and he failed to reasonably act and
prevent further crimes or punish the
rebel groups (“Even a ‘Big Man’,” 2012).
The Rome Statute outlines a number of
actions that are considered to be crimes
against humanity. Additionally, as head
of state, Taylor had a legal responsibility
the protect the civilian population.
When a head of state has knowledge of
such acts being systematically directed
against a civilian population and does
not condemn such criminal acts, then
the head of state is legally responsible
(“International Criminal Court,” 1998).
To prove Taylor’s innocence, the
defense argued Taylor was a maker of
peace who, through the capacity of
presidential office, was trying to make
settlement negotiations in a conflicted
time in Sierra Leone. Additionally, the
defense made claims in their arguments
that Taylor’s trial was a conspiracy by
the West to remove Taylor from power
(“Charles Taylor,” 2018). During the trial,
the defense called upon twenty-one
witnesses to testify in order to challenge
the claims of the prosecution. The
witnesses were comprised of individuals
who were prior leaders and fighters from
the Revolutionary United Front and the
Armed Forces Revolutionary Council.
Taylor also provided testimony during
his trial (“Even a ‘Big Man’,” 2012).
On April 26, 2012, the Trial
Chamber of the SCSL found Taylor
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt on
11 counts of planning, abetting, and
aiding war crimes in addition to be
found guilty of crimes against humanity.
Taylor was also found guilty of planning
attacks on areas rich in diamonds in
Sierra Leone. However, according to
the court’s judges, the prosecution

failed to show proof of Taylor being
individually responsible for the criminal
acts committed beyond a reasonable
doubt (“Even a ‘Big Man’,” 2012). Taylor
was sentenced to serve 50 years in
prison and following his conviction, he
was transferred to Frankland Prison
located in Durham, United Kingdom
to serve his prison sentence (“Charles
Taylor,” 2018). The location of where
Taylor would serve his prison sentence
if convicted was previously agreed
upon by The Hague and the SCSL when
the case was transferred. The Hague
agreed to allow the SCSL to transfer the
court to The Hague with the stipulation
that if Taylor were convicted, then he
would be imprisoned and serve his
prison sentence in another country.
The United Kingdom extended an offer
to hold Taylor in a British prison if he
were to be found guilty of the crimes.
The Frankland Prison was chosen
in particular because the Frankland
Prison is a high-security prison with the
capacity to house high-risk and highprofile criminals (Summers, 2012).

Taylor’s Case Serves as a Model for
Assad
Charles Taylor’s case is significant
because Taylor was the first head of
state to be indicted and put on trial
for international crimes since the
Nuremberg trials (Mandhane, 2011).
His case is also significant to finding
a way to indict and try Assad because
Taylor’s case can be seen as a blueprint
for building a case against Assad. The
current standings in Syria under Assad’s
regime and Assad’s actions during
the civil war in Syria share common
elements with Taylor and the Sierra
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Leone during the 1990s. For instance,
Taylor was a head of state when he was
indicted and Assad is currently is a
head of state while perpetrating similar
crimes to that of Taylor (Rose, 2012).
Some of the crimes Assad has committed
during the Syrian Civil War include:
rape, targeting civilians, sieges, forced
disappearances, forced displacements
of thousands of Syrians, torture, and
the murder of thousands of individuals
throughout the country (Human Rights
Watch, 2018). Each of these acts are
considered to be war crimes and crimes
against humanity (“Rome Statute”).
During the civil war in Sierra Leone,
Taylor committed crimes such as
murder, the collective punishment of a
civilian population, torture, abductions,
and acts of terrorism. These actions
are also considered to be war crimes
and crimes against humanity (“Charles
Taylor,” 2018). During Taylor’s trial the
SCSL used reports from the U.N. in
addition to media reports as evidence
to prove Taylor had knowledge of the
crimes being committed. As in the case
with Assad, the U.N. has collected and
continues to collect evidence for reports
to show how the crimes committed are
ongoing and the role Assad plays in
such criminal acts (Rose, 2012).
In analyzing the similar
characteristics between Assad and
Taylor, Taylor’s case is an example of how
indicting and trying Assad for violating
international laws could be possible
since Taylor was also a head of state
who was under similar circumstances,
committed similar crimes, and was
still indicted and tried under pressure
from the international community. In
fact, some experts in international law
agree that not only are the two cases

similar, but the case against Assad is
stronger than Taylor’s case was when he
was president of Liberia. For instance,
the SCSL heavily relied on facts that
Taylor was often in contact with the
Revolutionary United Front and the
Armed Forces Revolutionary Council
forces to plan and carry out crimes;
however, the court found Taylor’s orders
were advisory in nature as he operated
through aides and the orders were not
obeyed (Rose, 2012). This resulted in
Taylor being found not guilty of ordering
soldiers to commit crimes under the
concept of superior responsibility
since soldiers who were ordered to go
to Sierra Leone to fight in the civil war
did not stay under Taylor’s control.
In contrast, reports from the U.N.
Human Rights Council provide relevant
information to prove that Assad directs
the day-to-day commands of the Syrian
military. Reports also indicate how
operations violating human rights have
been carried out by Syria’s military in
a way that requires direction from the
state. Therefore, Assad’s case has the
element necessary for the conviction
of ordering and planning crimes, the
element Taylor’s case lacked showing
how the Assad’s case is even stronger
than Taylor’s case (Rose, 2012). Overall,
the case of Charles Taylor provides
a blueprint for how Assad could be
indicted and put on trial for his actions.
Table 2
A Similar Comparison of Charles Taylor
and Bashar al-Assad
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Limitations to Creating Special
Tribunals

the tribunal running throughout the
duration of a trial. The costs of tribunals
are extensive because international
tribunals are formed to investigate and
try complex cases that involve terrorism,
organized crime, white-collar crimes,
as well as other crimes that fall under
the category of war crimes and crimes
against humanity. Such crimes are by
definition widespread and systematic
crimes. Investigations of these crimes
involve the examination of thousands
of incidents that have occurred over

Despite the examples of the SCSL and
the ICTY, which are tribunals that were
both successfully created to try complex
violations of international laws, many
tribunals are never even an option to
consider (Bass, 2003). International
tribunals are often not considered
or are unsuccessful because of the
significant costs of creating the tribunal
and the continued expenses for keeping
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a period of years that often occur
in remote locations and in multiple
languages (Skilbeck, 2008).
The tribunal bears the
responsibility of providing the budget
for crime scene analysis and forensic
evidence services which require
considerable resources. The tribunal’s
budget provides financing for travel
expenses of the hundreds of victims,
witnesses, and investigators called upon
by the prosecution and the defense.
Funds for a detention unit to transport
and house suspects; security to protect
the premises of the tribunal as well as
the staffers, visitors, and suspects; and
funds for building and facility costs
and the salaries of staff members must
also come from the tribunal’s budget.
(“The Cost of Justice”). Translation
services are a necessity in tribunals as
well as the reconciliation of civil law
and common law in order to establish
and implement procedural rules and
rules of evidence. Both of these services
are time consuming processes and in
international tribunals the more time
a tribunal takes to try a case, the more
funding a tribunal will need to continue
operation.
The cost of tribunals such
as the ICTY and the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)
individually reached as much as $100
million per year (Dicker & Keppler,
2004). Costs of a tribunal before the
commencement of a trial could be as
much as $708,000 as was the case in the
ICTY. Unlike a simple murder trial in a
national criminal justice that could last
months, trials in international tribunals
are so extensive because crimes being
tried and the laws being applied are so
complex. The set-up of the tribunal is

time consuming and the proceedings
of the trial may take years leading to
excessive and unpredictable costs
(Skilbeck, 2008). When considering
an international tribunal as an option,
after the cost-benefit analysis ratio of a
tribunal, states often argue the financial
investments of a tribunal are better
used in post-conflict regions to support
reconstruction and development.
The financial burdens of financing
tribunals are often outweighed leading
to the unsuccessful implementation
of international tribunals, despite the
successes of the SCSL and the ICTY
(Malone, 2008).

Contrasts in the Cases of Assad,
Milošević, and Taylor
There are similar comparisons between
the cases of Assad, Milošević, and Taylor
that allow for Milošević and Taylor’s
cases to be viewed as models when
determining how to try Assad under
international laws. However, Assad’s
case deviates from both Milošević’s
case and Taylor’s case in ways that
will likely pose new problems that the
cases of Milošević and Taylor never
had to contemplate. One of the most
significant differences separating Assad
from both Milošević and Taylor is how
the Syrian Civil War has become a larger
international conflict (“Why is there
War,” 2018). For instance, the conflict’s
actors are no longer just Assad and the
rebel groups (Friedman, 2018). There
are a number of state actors involved in
Syria. For instance, Russia has military
bases in Syria and has supported Assad
by launching air campaigns. Russia
has been a key influence in turning the
Syrian civil war in Assad’s favor. Iran is
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also involved in Syria’s civil war and has
deployed hundreds of troops to assist
Assad’s military and has financially
supported Assad with billions of dollars.
Iraq, Afghanistan, and Yemen have each
sent armed and trained Shia Muslim
militiamen, mostly from the terrorist
organization Hezbollah, to fight for
Assad (“Why is there War,” 2018).
The United States, France,
and other Western countries have
provided support to rebel groups in
Syria. These states have carried out
airstrikes against Assad and supported
groups such as the Syrian Democratic
Forces in an effort to capture territory
from jihadists. Turkey has provided
support to the rebels by containing
the Kurdish military. Saudi Arabia has
provided arms and financial support to
the rebel groups. Israel has conducted
hundreds of airstrikes against Syria
in an effort to obstruct Iran’s military
entrenchment in Syria and to obstruct
Hezbollah from receiving weapons from
Iran (“Why is there War,” 2018). Violence
from the Syrian civil war has also spilled
over into Jordan and is wearing on the
social, economic, and political fabric
of Jordan as the country has become
a point of transit for external support
for the rebel groups. This has led to
Jordan being vulnerable to retribution
from Iran’s Quds Force, Hezbollah, and
other agents associated with Assad’s
regime. The growing refugee population
in Jordan is putting pressure on scarce
water supplies and the state’s security
since Jordan no longer has the capacity
to bear such large numbers of refugees
and is also being used as a port of entry
for Syrian fighters, weapons, and money
(Young, Stebbins, Frederick, & AlShahery, 2014).

The Syrian civil war is
recognized as an international conflict
because of the number of states within
the international community who
have become entangled in the Syrian
civil war. Additionally, many of the
states have diverging interests with
one another and their loyalties are split
between Assad and the rebels triggering
other conflicts between states. The
Syrian civil war and diverging views
of Assad’s regime is just part of the
complex web of this war. Syria is also
about the confrontation between two
of the world’s largest military powers,
the United States and Russia; two
NATO members, the United States
and Turkey; and sworn enemies, Israel
and Iran. The Syrian civil war is at an
intense international level, unlike that
of the Balkans or Sierra Leone. States
cannot make foreign policy or military
decisions in Syria without taking into
consideration the other states involved
in Syria at the risk of starting another
war (Friedman, 2018). This complicates
solutions to indicting and trying Assad,
especially since Assad has an ally like
Russia who would likely provide Assad
with protection from indictment and
trial.
Kosovo suffered some of
Milošević’s worst atrocities and
unlike Syria, the war in Kosovo was
less internationalized as the conflict
was essentially contained within the
Southern Balkans and had a minimal
chance of spillover into neighboring
states threatening to destabilize or
engage other regions in conflicts
(Kaplan, 2013). Kosovo is located in
Europe, where the states north of the
Balkans have democratic forms of
government (Khazan, 2013). States
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that are democracies are generally
more stable states (Quinn & Wooley,
2001). The more stable democratic
states neighboring Kosovo were able
to contain the ethnic conflict from
spilling over into their borders and
causing instability. In contrast, the
undemocratic states surrounding
Syria were already in the midst of
instability themselves and Assad’s civil
war has been spilling over into other
neighboring states such as Lebanon
and Turkey. This made interventionist
strategies a more secure policy option
in targeting Miloševic as there was less
fear of inflaming unstable territories or
causing conflicts between other states
(Khazan, 2013).
Taylor’s conflict in Sierra Leone
was an internationalized civil war;
however, the Sierra Leone civil war was
not on the same international level as
Syria. West Africa has long been a region
of civil wars and violence, and the civil
wars in this region of Africa in particular
often intimately affect neighboring
states (Bah, 2013). The Sierra Leone civil
war was no different in this sense as
the civil war was produced by conflicts
that were spilling over the border from
Liberia into Sierra Leone during the
Liberian civil war. The civil war in Sierra
Leone was largely confined to SubSaharan Africa. The interconnections
between the Sierra Leone civil war and
Liberian civil war did not incite any
additional violence in the West African
community (Fyfe, Sesay, & Nicol, 2018).
There were other outside
actors who engaged in the conflict
taking place in Sierra Leone such as
the United Kingdom who sent troops
to Sierra Leone in order to secure
efforts for evacuations, provide security,

and provide operational training and
support to government forces. Nigeria
sent the Economic Community of
West African States Monitoring Group
(ECOMOG) to Sierra Leone to try to end
the rebellion and maintain stability. The
U.N. intervened and worked to create
the United Nations Mission to Sierra
Leone, a peacekeeping force designed to
enforce the Lomé Peace Accord, which
provided cease fires provisions and
provisions for disarming combatants
and utilizing power-sharing to create
a political settlement (World Peace
Foundation, 2015). As already noted,
Liberia was a state actor involved in
Sierra Leone since Liberian President
Taylor is responsible for inciting a civil
war in Sierra Leone. South Africa is also
recognized as being engaged in Sierra
Leone since the International Monetary
Fund pushed South Africa to intervene
because the International Monetary
Fund was providing Sierra Leone
government with financial support to
destroy the rebellion in the country
(World Peace Foundation, 2015). Lastly,
the United States was involved in the
Sierra Leone civil war, but the United
States did not have direct involvement.
The United States privately pressured
the Sierra Leone government to make
a negotiation with the rebel forces
and negotiate a peace agreement.
Despite members of the international
community responding to the civil
war in Sierra Leone and neighboring
countries being affected by the civil
war, some of the largest and most
influential members of the international
community, such as the United States
and Russia were not directly involved
in the civil war in Sierra Leone. Though
this was an internationalized conflict,
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conflicting interests between the states
in regards to Sierra Leone did not foster
risks of new wars between the states
(World Peace Foundation, 2015).
Assad diverges again from
Milošević and Taylor when comparing
the leadership stability of Assad
compared to the leadership stability
of Milošević and Taylor. For instance,
both Milošević and Taylor were ousted
from political office, making both of
the former presidents more vulnerable
to being prosecuted for international
crimes. Milošević began to fall from
power in the spring of 1999 when
NATO carried out an 11-week bombing
campaign against the Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia after NATO states had
failed to individually or collectively
create policies to prevent Milošević
from continually provoking wars in the
Balkans.
Milošević
accepted
the
demands of NATO after rationally
calculating that continuing to resist the
international community he was risking
everything and had nothing to gain. If
Milosevic continued to resist, he knew
his actions would result in escalated
bombings. His decision to capitulate
rested on knowing a NATO military
presence that would claim the rights to
access all of Yugoslavia and having the
ability to decide the future of Kosovo by
the enforcement of a NATO referendum,
which would cause a loss of all of Serbia.
Overall, Serbia’s control over Kosovo
and Milosevic’s personal rule and
physical survival was at risk if Milosevic
chose to resist (Lambeth, 2001). On June
10, 1999 Milošević fell to his resistance
and agreed to a peace agreement with
NATO. The peace agreement called
upon Milošević to remove his Serb

forces from Kosovo, and Milošević’s Serb
forces were replaced with peacekeeping
troops from NATO (“NATO Bombs
Yugoslavia,”2018). The bombings not
only resulted in Milošević’s loss of
Kosovo, but he was also stripped of
his legitimacy and popularity from his
deepest supporters and police forces at
a time when his popularity was already
dwindling. The NATO bombings created
a united opposition who aligned with
Vojislav Kostunica rather than Milošević
during the 2000 election. This resulted
in Milošević being defeated in the 2000
presidential election and falling from
power (Erlanger, 2000).
Even though Milošević had
been indicted in 1999 as a sitting
president, his electoral defeat during
the 2000 presidential election made him
more vulnerable to prosecution. Once
Milošević was no longer president,
he was not afforded the benefits of
state immunity, making the process of
arresting the former president easier
for the ICTY. Additionally, his loss of
power motivated the prime minister
of Serbia, Zoran Djindjić, to have
Milošević extradited to an American
airbase located in Bosnia, where he
was then taken into the custody of the
ICTY and put on trial (Penrose, 2010).
The NATO bombings were significant
in that they caused Miloševi to lose his
deepest supporters and his legitimacy
and indirectly aided in his presidential
election defeat and opening a window
of opportunity to ease the process of the
ICTY gaining custody and ensuring a
trial (Erlanger, 2000).
As for Taylor, he was forced
out of the Liberian presidency in 2003
and into exile. After the U.N. imposed
sanctions on Liberia to punish Taylor
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and Nigeria agreed to the extradition
(“Charles Ghankay Taylor,” 2017). Once
Taylor was turned over to Liberia, he was
vulnerable to prosecution, and the SCSL
seized the opportunity to apprehend
Taylor and try him for international
crimes (Romano & Nollkaemper, 2003).
Assad’s situation conflicts with
Milošević’s and Taylor’s because his
leadership has more stability, which
poses additional complications to
indicting and trying him. For example,
Syria, like Kosovo, has been the target of
military style attacks as well. In 2007, as
a form of retribution for using chemical
weapons on civilians, the United States
launched 59 tomahawk cruise missiles
into Syria targeting a Syrian air base
(Cooper, Gibbons-Neff, & Hubbard,
2018). In 2018, the United States and
European allies once again launched
airstrikes to punish Assad yet again for
another chemical attack. Unlike Kosovo,
the airstrikes failed to be instrumental
in Assad losing legitimacy or shaking
Assad into fear (Cooper, Gibbons-Neff,
& Hubbard, 2018). Also, like Taylor,
Assad has received international
condemnation and has been asked to
relinquish his presidency (Alrifai, 2017).
However, Assad has no intentions to
step down from his presidency. Assad
has publicly addressed the calls for
him to step down as Syria’s president
by saying that Syria is facing a national
challenge, and a president does not
run from challenges and he will not be
stepping down as president of Syria.
Assad has denied requests to renounce
his presidency; therefore, thinking
Assad will be open to negotiating
peace deals that would include sending
him into exile is unrealistic (“Syria’s
President,” 2012).

for his atrocities and refusal to negotiate
a peace deal civil war in Sierra Leone
continued to escalate. This prompted
the international community to
condemn Taylor as Liberian president
and call for Taylor to relinquish
his presidency (“Charles Ghankay
Taylor,” 2017). After condemnation
and continued widespread war and
violence, Taylor and the rebels came to
a peace agreement to end Liberia’s civil
war, which would also declare the war
to be over in Sierra Leone as well. In the
peace agreement both parties agreed
that the fighting would cease if Taylor
stepped down as president of Liberia
and was exiled from the country. Charles
would only agree to the peace deal if he
received asylum. Taylor accepted an
offer from Nigeria for asylum and Taylor
relinquished his power as president on
August 11, 2003. Vice president, Moses
Blah, ascended the Liberian presidency
and the wars in Liberia and Sierra
Leone ceased as planned and Taylor left
the country to live in asylum in Nigeria
(“Liberian President,” 2003).
Initially, under the terms of the
agreement, when Taylor sought asylum
in Nigeria he was still given immunity
from being arrested and tried for
international crimes. However, while
living in exile in Nigeria, human rights
groups found Taylor to be violating
the terms of the peace agreement by
interfering with politics in Liberia and
trying to escape from Nigeria. Taylor
was arrested by Nigerian authorities
for his attempted escape and lost his
rights to immunity under the peace
agreement (“Charles Taylor ‘Duped’,”
2009). After violating the terms to
the peace agreement, in March 2006,
Liberia requested Taylor’s extradition
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state’s territorial integrity. Putin has
remained committed to protecting
the Assad regime and will likely
provide protections to Assad if he is
to be indicted on charges of violating
international laws (Tétrault-Farber
& Williams, 2017). Not only were
Milošević and Taylor’s conflicts not
as internationalized as Assad’s, but
neither Milošević or Taylor had a state
as influential as Russia to intervene and
pledge to protect their state sovereignty
and territory or provide them with such
vast amounts of military and financial
support.

In contrast with Milošević and
Taylor’s cases, Assad’s future as Syria’s
president seems to be more secure
than ever. No one who remains on the
battlefield in Syria is either unwilling
or does not have the ability to topple
Assad’s regime. The rebel forces are
weakening and beginning to embrace
the possibility of the inevitable rule of
Assad. Rebel occupied territories have
shrunk, and international powers are
losing interest in supporting the rebels
and turning their focus to eliminating
the Islamic State (Hubbard, 2017).
President Trump has cancelled the
clandestine American program that
allowed the Central Intelligence Agency
(C.I.A.) to covertly provide the Syrian
rebel groups with arms and supplies. The
program was ended because President
Trump recognized the program was
failing. He began to recognize that
toppling Assad in the near future is
unlikely (Sanger, Schmitt, & Hubbard,
2017). Regional powers and even foreign
officials along with Syrians have started
running operations as if Assad will
remain in power. Assad’s allies perceive
Syria as an impending victory with
talks about how the rebuilding of Syria
will take place. Syria even hosted an
international trade fair in 2017 where
Assad signed an agreement with Iran
to rebuild Syria’s power grid (Hubbard,
2017).
Russia has also helped Assad’s
forces become more advanced, which
has allowed for Assad to regain lost
territory and have more success in
the war since Russia’s intervention
(Hubbard, 2017). In 2017, Russia’s
president, Vladimir Putin, pledged
Russia’s full support to protecting
the sovereignty of Syria as well as the

How a Special Tribunal and
Indictment Can Work for Assad
The primary focus of this paper is to
evaluate the prospects of indicting and
trying Assad for violating international
laws, and after a detailed evaluation
of the similar cases of Miloševi and
Taylor, the prospects of the international
community holding Assad accountable
in court for violating international
laws are likely. The Commission for
International Justice and Accountability
(CIJA) prosecutes some of the worst
human rights criminals throughout the
world and works to deter human rights
abuses though litigation, policy, and
transnational justice strategies (The
Center for Justice & Accountability).
CIJA is located in at an undisclosed
location in Western Europe and
employs 150 workers, whom are nonSyrians who have experience working in
special tribunals. Since the outbreak of
the civil war in Syria in 2011, CIJA has
been working underground to collect
evidence and prepare indictments as if
Assad or other high-ranking government
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officials from his regime were to go
trial any day (Carrillo, Frillmann, &
Molinsky, 2016). Currently, CIJA has
collected nearly a million documents
that would be used as evidence at a trial
in an effort to convict Assad and other
high-ranking officials that are traced
back to Assad’s crimes. The information
systems in Syria’s government are not
as advanced as those in the developed
world, so a single sheet of paper has to
be passed from desk-to-desk and each
person must either sign or initial the
paper with their comments. CIJA has
been able to collect nearly a million of
these government documents and use
them to show Assad as presiding over
the chain of command from the highestlevel and ordering international crimes
to be executed on a mass level across
Syria. CIJA has also been able to link
the crimes back to all of Syria’s security
branches and high-ranking officials
(Carrillo, et al., 2016).
Several
hundred
victim
witnesses have been interviewed by
CIJA to secure patterns of perpetration
as part of the pattern evidence (Carrillo,
et al., 2016). Continuing to collect this
kind of fresh evidence is vital because
once the war in Syria ends, evidence
collection will become an even more
dangerous and difficult process. The
more evidence CIJA collects generates
a higher probability of Assad being held
accountable for his crimes as saying
no to holding Assad accountable in
court will be difficult when there are
mountains of evidence against him that
have been collected (Kelly & Whiting,
2018). CIJA reports their evidence
collection already provides sufficient
links to Assad as well as to his deputies
and to the widespread crimes being

committed in Syria. CIJA also reports
that there is only a limited time before
Syria’s most serious perpetrators from
Assad’s regime are being brought to
justice and Assad will then follow suit.
And when Assad withstands trial, the
court will be presented with the best
evidence that a tribunal has seen since
Nuremberg (Carrillo, et al., 2016).
One of the most challenging
problems war crime tribunals face
is having financial support to create
the court and keep the court running
because tribunals that are independent
of the ICC come with a great financial
expense (Keating, 2012). However,
the independent investigations being
conducted by CIJA to collect evidence
for a trial are being funded without a
court mandate by state governments
committed to bringing Assad and his
perpetrators to justice (Carrillo, et
al., 2016). In addition to governments
specifically funding the investigations
of Assad and the members of his
government, CIJA receives financial
support from the U.N. as well as a
great number of outside sources (The
Center for Justice & Accountability,
2018). If states are already willing to
fund the investigations of Assad’s crime
in preparation of one day bringing
Assad to trial, then it is likely that such
states throughout the international
community will remain committed
to providing the necessary financial
support to create a tribunal where
Assad will be held accountable.
There is evidence to suggest that the
international community disapproves
of Assad’s regime as there have already
been efforts by the U.N. Security Council
in 2014 to bring Assad to justice through
the ICC. Vetoes from Russia and China
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have been the most significant factors
standing in the way of bringing Assad
to justice through the ICC since 2014
(Sengupta, 2014). Additionally, the
Secretary General of the U.N. has publicly
condemned the acts of the Assad
regime as well and has moved to create
resolutions to try to bring the atrocities
to an end (Secretary-General, 2018).
Aside from opposition from Russia and
China, the international community as
a whole and the U.N. have tried to pass
resolutions giving the ICC jurisdiction
over Assad and are currently funding
CIJA investigations in preparation of a
trial. There is reason to believe members
of the international community will
financially support a special tribunal to
bring Assad to justice.
The primary purpose of the
tribunal is to try Assad for international
crimes, but the court will also have
the capacity to try high-level Syrian
government officials who are linked to
carrying out Assad’s instructions. When
considering the venue of the special
tribunal, Syria is an unlikely location for
the tribunal because the special tribunal
will be designed to try highly politicized
figures; therefore, locating the tribunal
in Syria could incite violence and chaos
while threatening the little stability and
peace Syria has. The special tribunal
would also be politically vulnerable to
manipulation (Chadwick, 2017). Setting
up the tribunal in Syria risks creating
a special tribunal that is limited in
charges and a rushed due process due to
victims being unable to provide accurate
testimony without fear of further
persecution by the Syrian government.
Syrian state agencies would also be
unlikely to be willing to cooperate with
the tribunal (Aboueldahab, 2017).

Creating a special tribunal in Syria may
not be a viable option, however, there
are other likely options for the venue
of a special tribunal for Assad. For
instance, the SCSL used to try Taylor
was originally located in Sierra Leone
rather than in Liberia, where Taylor
was president (Special Court for Sierra
Leone). Locating Assad’s tribunal in a
neighboring country such as Jordan or
Turkey could be an option for Assad.
Either Jordan or Turkey are ideal host
countries for a special tribunal for
Assad since both countries have been
dramatically impacted by the spillover
effects of the Syrian civil war. For
instance, Jordan now hosts more than
600,000 Syrian refugees and 10 percent
of the country’s population is now
Syrian and Turkey houses nearly 750,000
refugees from Syria (Van Schaack, 2014).
If the venue of the special tribunal
were to be established in either of the
neighboring countries of Jordan or
Turkey, then the tribunal could more
easily facilitate the integration of Syrian
jurors, lawyers, and other staff members
into the special tribunal. Either of these
locations would give the special tribunal
a greater degree of ownership and
legitimacy that would also contribute
to building domestic capacity (Van
Schaack, 2014). If Jordan or Turkey were
to agree to host the special tribunal, then
the host country would be authorized
to exercise domestic jurisdiction over
Assad for the flight of Syrian refugees
into Jordan and Turkey, and the political
consequences the millions of refugees
have caused (Van Schaack, 2014).
A second option for the venue
of the special tribunal is The Hague.
The Hague is the location of a number
of tribunals and courts, including the
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International Court of Justice and Peace
and the ICC. The Hague is thought
of as being the international city of
peace and justice, and is the chosen
venue of government and political
leaders, diplomats, institutions, nonprofit organizations, and businesses
when coming together to discuss
solutions to global problems, resolve
international disputes, or even to find
solutions to avoid armed conflict. Not
only is The Hague thought of as a city
of international peace and justice, but
The Hague is considered to be a neutral
location, which often makes the location
a logical choice for holding international
conferences and addressing conflicts
between countries throughout the
international community (The Hague,
2017).
The Hague has as served as
the location of both the ICTY and SCSL
as well as the location for the Special
Tribunal for Lebanon, the Extraordinary
Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia,
and the International Criminal Tribunal
for Rwanda (“Courts and Tribunals”).
As previously mentioned, The SCSL
was relocated from Sierra Leone to The
Hague due to Taylor’s trial provoking
violence and threatening West Africa’s
peace and stability (Special Court
for Sierra Leone). Taylor, being the
former president of Liberia who was
indicted for violating international
laws, attracted global attention to his
trial making his case a high-profile and
closely followed trial, which contributed
to the violence and threats of instability.
The Hague provided a neutral and more
peaceful environment for Taylor’s highprofile trial to take place (Special Court
for Sierra Leone). Assad is already a
widely watched political figure as the

president of Syria. However, Assad
is also extensively monitored for his
violations of international law and
much of the international community
is skeptical as to if justice will be served
and Assad will be indicted and tried for
his crimes (Carrillo, et al. 2016). This
would contribute to the high-profile
nature of his trial as a president. Syria,
along with the rest of the international
community, would likely follow Assad’s
trial closely, which poses the risk of
inciting violence in areas where his
atrocities took place if the trial were to
be held in a neighboring country. The
Hague is a venue option to consider
because the location would provide
a more neutral location, eliminating
possible outbreaks of violence and
threats to stability and peace.
The crimes committed by
Assad are clear, there is ample evidence
sufficiently linking Assad to the mass
atrocities throughout Syria since 2011,
and there is a likely chance that members
of the international community would
be willing to financially support the
tribunal. However, due to Assad
being a sitting head of state, Assad
has immunity from foreign criminal
jurisdiction making Assad’s indictment
the most complicated and doubtful
part of determining the likelihood of
trying Assad for international crimes
(Kiyani, 2013). A possible option to
indicting Assad is by the use of universal
jurisdiction as this principle is generally
used when traditional forms of criminal
jurisdiction do not exist.
Universal jurisdiction is the
principle that a national court has the
authority to prosecute individuals for
more serious international crimes that
occur in other territories. (International
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Justice Resource Center). Universal
jurisdiction is based on the principle of
responsibility to protect. This principle
promotes the idea that members of the
international community are obligated
to assist states in providing protection
to individuals within the territory of
a given state through intervention to
prevent crimes like crimes against
humanity, war crimes, genocide, and
torture (International Justice Resource
Center). Therefore, any state whose
has legislation that allows for universal
jurisdiction to be invoked can actively
prosecute a non-national individual
for the most serious international
crimes (Godhardt, 2017). Most states
recognize universal jurisdiction and are
signatories of conventions that provide
the state to utilize universal jurisdiction
when necessary (Human Rights Watch,
2008).
The most significant reason
as to why universal jurisdiction is an
option to consider when trying Assad in
a special tribunal is because universal
jurisdiction prevents the impunity of
dignitaries while ensuring due process
of law (Godhardt, 2017). While Assad
does have immunity as the current
president of Syria, he will not be afforded
this advantage if universal jurisdiction
is invoked. Assad’s violations of
international laws involve the illegal use
of chemical weapons, crimes against
humanity, war crimes, and torture
(Kelly & Whiting, 2018). Each of the
crimes Assad has committed qualify for
a state to pursue the remedy of universal
jurisdiction. There are several cases
where universal jurisdiction has been
used to successfully indict dignitaries.
For example, Spain invoked universal
jurisdiction to indict and extradite

former Chilean dictator Augusto
Pinochet. Spain also invoked universal
jurisdiction to prosecute Guatemalan
officials involved in the Guatemalan
genocide and in a separate case to
prosecute an Argentine naval officer for
committing crimes against humanity
during the Dirty War (International
Justice Resource Center). Universal
jurisdiction has yet to be applied to
Assad because first the civil war in Syria
must come to an end with one or more
of the parties involved in the conflict
claiming victory so the 1949 Geneva
Conventions may come into effect. The
obligations of the Geneva Conventions
will then enable the prosecution of
Assad and other high-ranking officials
from the Assad regime who are linked
to systematically carrying out Assad’s
orders that violate international laws
(Khen).

Is Bringing Assad to Justice Possible?
As the president of Syria, Assad has
deliberately
and
indiscriminately
attacked civilians in Syria since the
outbreak of the Syrian civil war in 2011
(Human Rights Watch 2018). Assad
has repeatedly used chemical weapons
and nerve agents against civilian
populations, employed starvation
and withheld humanitarian aid,
forcibly displaced Syrians and caused
the disappearance of thousands of
Syrians, and arbitrary arrested and
used methods of torture. This led to the
deaths of more than 400,000 people and
the displacement of millions of Syrians
over the last seven years (Human Rights
Watch, 2018). Assad’s actions clearly
violate international law under the
Rome Statute allowing for Assad to be
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charged with crimes against humanity,
war crimes, the illegal use of chemical
weapons, and torture (The International
Criminal Court, 1998). After evaluating
the cases of Miloševi and Taylor, the
most effective way for bringing Assad
to justice will be through possibly
invoking the legal remedy of universal
jurisdiction and pursuing a trial through
the creation of a special tribunal located
in either a neighboring country or at
The Hague. Additionally, the prospects
of a guilty verdict are also likely with

the vast amount of sufficient that has
been collected directly linking Assad to
his crimes. Bringing Assad to justice for
his crimes is not likely to take place in
the near future and will present many
challenges and complications. However,
indicting and trying Assad for violating
international laws is possible and Assad
may likely be held accountable for
violating international laws many years
in the future.
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